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There has been little empirical work evaluating the sensitivity of fertility to financial 
incentives at the household level. We put forward an identification strategy that relies on the 
fact that variation of wages induces variation in benefits and tax credits among “comparable” 
households. We implement this approach by estimating a discrete choice model of female 
participation and fertility, using individual data from the French Labor Force Survey and a 
fairly detailed representation of the French tax-benefit system. Our results suggest that 
financial incentives play a notable role in determining fertility decisions in France, both for 
the first and for the third child. As an example, an unconditional child benefit with a direct 
cost of 0.3% of GDP might raise total fertility by about 0.3 point. 
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1 Introduction
It is natural for economists raised on the New Home Economics to presume
the existence of a link between family transfers and fertility. The standard
model of Becker (1960, 1991) and Willis (1973) implies that the demand for
children depends on their cost, which in turn depends on family transfers
(see for instance Cigno (1986) for a theoretical study of the impact of taxes
on fertility). Yet in many countries (see Gauthier (1996)), family benets
are mostly designed as a way to ensure a minimum standard of living to
families and children. There are notable exceptions: the policies towards
families implemented in France at the end of the 1930s were in part based on
the belief that family benets increase fertility, and a 2004 reform explicitly
mentions fertility as a concern. Sweden and Qu ebec have also implemented
pronatalist policies in the past; more recently, other countries with much
more dire fertility issues such as Germany and Russia have enacted policy
measures designed to bring them closer to the replacement rate.
How can we quantify the eects of nancial incentives on fertility? Several
approaches have been used so far (see for instance the survey of Hotz, Kler-
man, and Willis (1997)). A rst group of studies uses panel data on countries;
then the unit of observation is a given (country, year) pair.1 This line of work
relies on the reasonable assumption that there is variation in family policies
over time and space that is not entirely explained by the other explanatory
variables. On the other hand, it suers from the usual glaring problems of
panel country regressions: arbitrary functional form assumptions and a huge
1Thus the work of Ekert-Ja e (1986), Blanchet and Ekert-Ja e (1994) and Gauthier
and Hatzius (1997) suggests that the French family benet system may increase total
fertility by 0:1 to 0:2 child per woman.
1number of omitted variables whose variation must be heroically assumed to
be orthogonal to the variation in policy parameters. These are compounded
by the fact that these studies sum up very complex tax-benet systems in
a couple of variables only2. Thus the results obtained in these papers seem
fragile.
More recent work has used individual data, which alone can provide the
analyst with a large number of observations and with enough information to
measure precisely nancial incentives to fertility. A few recent studies have
used the natural experiments approach to evaluate the fertility impact of a
given family benet. Thus Milligan (2004) studies the eect of a cash benet
given on the birth of a child in Qu ebec in the 1990s; by comparing fertility
of similar women residing in Qu ebec and in other Canadian states over this
period, it nds that this benet strongly stimulated fertility. However, his
approach cannot yield an estimate of a \price elasticity". Similar remarks
apply to Kearney (2004), who estimates the fertility eect of the introduc-
tion of family caps in many US states following the 1996 reform of welfare.3
A number of papers also studied the eects of the American welfare system
on fertility (see Mott (1998)); the results of Rosenzweig (1999) thus sug-
gest that in the 70s, social transfers like the AFDC had a large eect on the
probability that a young lower-class woman would become a single mother.
Keane and Wolpin (2007b, 2007a) estimate a dynamic programming model
of the decisions of young women. Their simulations suggest that the EITC,
whose amount is very low for single-child families, has increased the fertility
of high school dropouts by about 0:2 child per woman. Finally, Cohen, De-
hejia, and Romanov (2007) exploit a drastic reduction of child allowances in
Israel that aected mostly large families in 2003; their results suggest a large
2Ideally, one should also control for the endogeneity of policy variables, as argued by
Heckman (1976) and more recently by Besley and Case (2000).
3There is a small body of econometric literature that aims at estimating the eect of
female and male wages on fertility. Papers by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985), Hotz and
Miller (1988), Heckman and Walker (1989, 1990a, 1990b) conrm that as predicted by
theory, fertility decreases with the woman's potential wage and increases with the other
income of the household. The estimated eects are small; but as these papers make no
attempt to use the form of the tax-benet system, it is not quite clear what the estimated
coecients of wages represent in any case.
2negative impact on the fertility of poorer households and new immigrants.
This brief literature review shows that it is dicult to nd reliable sources
of variation and credible exclusion restrictions to identify the sensitivity of
fertility to the cost of children, both for theoretical and for practical reasons.4
Section 2 presents and justies our empirical strategy, which is based on
comparing the fertility outcomes of women who have similar characteristics
except for their wage and the wage of their partner. As family benets depend
on the two parents' primary incomes, this provides variation in incentives that
we use to identify the relevant elasticity. We explain in Section 2 the pros
and cons of such an approach to this particular problem.
We apply this idea to the case of France. We focus on French data not
only because we know it well, but also because France has a rather generous
and diverse family benet system. Its cost (including tax credits) is evaluated
at about 0:8% of GDP, and it comprises some unconditional, some means-
tested, and some employment-tested benets.
We set up a discrete choice model of fertility and participation decisions on
the French Labor Force Surveys of 1997, 1998 and 1999. A crucial identifying
tool is a fairly detailed representation of the relevant taxes and benets. We
have to account for women's participation decisions, given that they are
so closely linked to their fertility choices5. In our model, every woman is
characterized by her productivity, her disutility for work and her net utility
for a new child. If her productivity is smaller than the minimum wage,
the woman cannot take a job. Otherwise, she can take a job paid at her
productivity if she wishes to do so. She then jointly decides on participation
and fertility, depending on her individual characteristics.
We have had to make simplifying assumptions. Thus we reduce the com-
plex dynamic decision process of couples to a static reduced form. We ignore
4Our previous work (Laroque and Salani e (2004a, 2004b)) in fact illustrates it. In
our rst attempts at studying fertility behavior, we did not give center stage to issues of
identication; these earlier papers also included older women, which tended to contaminate
our estimates.
5A paper by Lefebvre, Brouillette, and Felteau (1994) estimated a nested logit of fertility
and participation on individual Canadian data; their results suggest that family benets
have a non-negligible impact on fertility. However, we devote much more attention to
identication issues.
3part-time work, even though we know that the birth of a child often leads a
woman to go from full-time to part-time. We also neglect child-care subsi-
dies, which are important both in theory6 and in practice7, as taking them
into account would require modeling the choice of child care mode.
We present our estimation results in section 3. They suggest that nancial
incentives play a notable role in determining fertility decisions in France, both
for the rst and for the third child. We simulate the increase in births that
results from adding to the existing tax-benet system a child subsidy of 150
euros per month. This would have a direct cost of about 0:3% of GDP8; and
according to our estimates, it would raise total fertility by about 0:3 point,
while reducing female labor supply by about 0:5 point.
Our paper completely skirts normative questions. Governments may sub-
sidize fertility because they feel that current policies deter childbearing, or
to \save Social Security", and of course for a host of non-economic reasons.
These are beyond our horizon here. On the other hand, it would be possible
to use our estimated model to analyze the redistributive eects of any reform
of family benets; we leave this for further research.
2 Identifying Incentive Eects
2.1 The Statistical Problem
Our aim here is to use data on fertility outcomes Fi, employment decisions Li
and explanatory variables Zi for various observational units to infer the eect
of nancial incentives on fertility. Financial incentives to fertility depend on
the tax-benet-system, which we represent as a function that maps the labor
supply and fertility decisions of the observation unit Fi and Li into a net
household income R(Fi;Li;Zi) that also depends on its characteristics Zi.
Thus we want to evaluate (both ex post and ex ante) the impact of changes
6See e.g. Apps and Rees (2004).
7Blau and Robins (1989) estimate the eect of child-care costs on fertility, using geo-
graphical variation in child-care availability. See also del Boca (2002) and Chon e, Leblanc,
and Robert-Bob ee (2004).
8We take this as a reasonable upper bound on what is politically feasible.
4in the function R on fertility outcomes. In France, the function R is very
complicated, highly nonlinear and not even dierentiable; but at least it is
public information and it can be evaluated for all values of its arguments.
It is hard to discuss identication at this level of generality; let us therefore
focus on the simple setup we actually use in our application, in which an
observational unit is a household at a given date, the decision variable Li =
0;1 is the woman's extensive margin decision of working or not, and the
fertility outcome Fi = 0;1 is the occurrence of a birth.
The vector of explanatory variables Zi may comprise several classes of
variables. Since a woman at a given period is our observational unit, Zi may
contain:
• socio-demographic variables xi such as education, region, past fertility,
marriage status, and so on, which may impact current fertility directly
or because they contribute to determining taxes and benets;
• the market wage of this woman wi, which we take to be her earning
potential if she does not actually work;
• the actual wage income of her partner (if any), which we denote wm
i .
Several of these variables are clearly not strongly exogenous: the unobserved
\taste for children", for instance, probably reduces human capital investment
and therefore education; and past fertility can only be weakly exogenous. We
abstract from endogeneity concerns in this section since we want to focus on
identication: we will assume that Z = (x;w;wm) is strongly exogenous. We
will also assume for now that w is observed for all women, whereas of course
it has to be imputed for non-working women.
If a woman's labor supply decision is L, then her wage income wL enters
the R function; but so does L itself since some benets are employment-
tested. Thus the tax-benet system can be described in our application by
four functions which correspond to the four alternatives L = 0;1;F = 0;1:
• net household income when the woman does not work and no birth
occurred R00(Z);
5• net household income when the woman does not work and a birth
occurred R01(Z);
• net household income when the woman works and no birth occurred
R10(Z);
• net household income when the woman works and a birth occurred
R11(Z).
Note that when the woman does not work, her market wage w does not enter
the net household income; thus R00(Z) and R01(Z) do not depend on w, but
only on X = (x;wm).
Given this notation, let Q be the distribution of the endogenous variables
L and F; we can write it in all generality as
Q(L;FjR00(X);R01(X);R10(Z);R11(Z);Z)
and our aim is to evaluate changes in the distribution of F when any of the
four functions Rij shifts.
In this setup, we can only identify nonparametrically from the data the
distribution of L and F conditional on Z, which we denote P(L;FjZ). Under
our exogeneity assumptions, this allows us to answer questions such as:
• what is the eect of more education on fertility?
• what is the eect of higher male or female wages on fertility?
On the other hand, it does not allow us to evaluate policy-induced changes
in R without further non-testable restrictions.
2.2 Identifying Assumptions
The basic problem we face is that since there are four alternatives, we can
identify nonparametrically only three functions of Z from the data. But
knowing Q requires identifying three functions of both Z and four other
arguments (the Rij's.) Before we discuss possible sources of exclusion re-
strictions, we introduce our approach to identication on the simple labor
supply model.
62.2.1 Identifying Labor Supply Behavior
As in our application, we focus here on the extensive margin9. In this case
we observe a probability of working P(Z); and our aim is\only"to recover a
probability Q(R0(X);R1(Z);Z), where R1 (resp. R0) is household net dispos-
able income when the woman works (resp. does not work.) Here one simple
way to achieve identication is to assume that
Assumption 1 The woman's market wage w only enters Q through its eect
on R1 (net household income when the woman works).
Assumption 2 The wage income of her partner (if any) wm only enters Q
through its eect on R1 and on R0 (net household income when the woman
does not work).
Recall our notation: X = (x;wm) and Z = (X;w). Given assumptions 1
and 2, we can write P(Z) as Q(R0(X);R1(Z);x). Then changes in w identify
the eect of R1 on labor supply Q; and changes in wm, compensated by
changes in w so as to leave R1 constant, identify the eect of R0 on labor
supply.
More formally, x x and let W2(x) be the support of the observed distri-
bution of (w;wm) given x. Then the eect of a change of the tax schedule
(R0;R1) into (R0
0;R0
1) is identied as follows.
Take any (w;wm) such that:
• (w;wm) 2 W2(x);
• there exists a solution (~ w; ~ wm) 2 W2(x) to
(
R0
0(wm;x) = R0(~ wm;x)
R0
1(w;wm;x) = R1(~ w; ~ wm;x):
Then the eect of such a policy change on the labour supply of an indi-
vidual with characteristics (w;wm) is just
P(~ w; ~ w
m;x)   P(w;w
m;x):
9The identication problem is similar on the intensive margin, unless of course (often
implicit) assumptions are made to constrain the possible causes of variation in hours.
7(and under assumptions 1 and 2, it clearly does not depend on the choice of
the solution (~ w; ~ wm)).
When the range of W2(x) is too small, identication may be sought
through further restrictions, which often involve x. E.g. let there be a vari-
able s that only enters Q through its eect on (R0;R1), and denote x = (s;t);
then for given Z = (w;wm;s;t), we only need to nd a solution (~ w; ~ wm; ~ s) to
(
R0
0(wm;s;t) = R0(~ wm; ~ s;t)
R0
1(w;wm;s;t) = R1(~ w; ~ wm; ~ s;t)
in the support of the distribution of (w;wm;s) given t, and the eect of the
change then is
P(~ w; ~ w
m; ~ s;t)   P(w;w
m;s;t):
While this is enough to identify the eects of changes in taxes and benets,
we need more if we want to identify the underlying utility functions. From
now on, the whole analysis is done conditional on x, which we drop from
the notation. Let us set up a standard binomial model. Labor supply is the
outcome of a utility maximization where
Assumption 3
• the utility of the woman is U1(R1) d when she works and her household
has disposable income R1;
• it is U0(R0) when she does not work and her household has disposable
income R0,
where d measures the random disutility of labor, unobserved by the econo-
metrician, which has a distribution G that does not depend on w or wm.
Similarly, U0 and U1 only depend on (w;wm) through R0 and R1.
Then we can reparameterize the probability of working as Q(R0;R1).
Identication of the binomial choice model has been studied by Matzkin
8(1992); but for our purposes, the following result in the line of Manski
(1985,1988) is more convenient:
Theorem 1 Assume the true model satises Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. More-
over assume that
1. G, U0 and U1 are dierentiable, with positive derivatives;
2. denote R2 the image of W2 by the pair of functions (R0;R1); then R2
has a non-empty interior in IR
2;
3. there exists a point (~ r0; ~ r1) in R2 such that Q(~ r0; ~ r1) = 0:5;
4. G(0) = 0:5.
Take any triple of functions (u0;u1;g) that is consistent with the data gen-
erated by (U0;U1;G). Then under these assumptions, there exist numbers a
(positive) and b such that for all (r0;r1) in the interior of R2,
u0(r0) = aU0(r0) + b and u1(r1) = aU1(r1) + b;
and dening the function (r0;r1) = u1(r1)   u0(r0) over R2,
g(y) = Q(r0;r1) if y = (r0;r1):
Proof: Take (r0;r1) inside R2. Since G0 > 0, simple dierentiation in























where a is constant, since it cannot depend on r1 by the rst equality, nor
on r0 by the second equality (and a is positive since utilities are increasing.)
9Integrating gives 
u0(r0) = aU0(r0) + b0
u1(r1) = aU1(r1) + b1:
Moreover, G(0) = 0:5 by assumption, so that
U1(~ r1)  U0(~ r0):
This equality must also hold for u0 and u1; but G(U1(~ r1) U0(~ r0)) = 0:5 can
also be rewritten as
G
















and so b0 = b1 = b. QED.
Note that this model has testable \nonparametric" implications:
1. Q must increase in R0 and decrease in R1;
2. log( Q0
0=Q0
1) must have a zero cross derivative.
While the rst one is fairly weak, the second one may provide an informative
check on the model. Recall Assumption 3: conditional on x, the distribution
of the disutility of labor d does not depend on (w;wm), that is, on (R0;R1).
If for instance the conditional variance of d depends on R0 and R1 in any way,
then the second restriction above will not hold. If the conditional mean of d
depends on (R0;R1), tests based on the second restriction will also detect it
unless this conditional mean is separably additive in R0 and R1.
2.2.2 Missing Wages
To be complete, we should recall that wages w are only observed for working
women. Selection may come from preference shocks or be linked to the
minimum wage. The issue is akin to the treatment eect problem: to achieve
nonparametric identication, we need one variable in the selection equation
10(into employment) that only enters the outcome equation (the wage equation)
through its eect on the propensity score. The partner's wage wm (if present)
can play such a role; in our specication we also use family composition
variables to that eect: they gure in the disutility of work|here in U1 U0|
but not in the wage equation.
2.2.3 Identifying Fertility Behavior
For the more complicated case of joint fertility-participation behavior, such
restrictions will not suce. Pursuing the strategy in section 2.2.1, we would
start by assuming that w only enters Q through R10 and R11 and that wm
only enters Q through the Rij's. Then we would want to identify the change




11) on a woman (w;wm;x) by
solving a system of equations of the form
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
R0
00(wm;x) = R00(~ wm; ~ x)
R0
01(wm;x) = R01(~ wm; ~ x)
R0
10(w;wm;x) = R10(~ w; ~ wm; ~ x)
R0
11(w;wm;x) = R11(~ w; ~ wm; ~ x):
Since we have four equations, this can only work if we can nd a subset s of
the variables in x that only enters Q through the Rij's; and the dimension of
s must be at least two. This is not a very appealing strategy: we can make
a reasonable case for excluding some variables from the disutility of labor
or the utility of income, but it is much harder for the costs and benets of
children.
A possible source for such variation in s is policy reforms that change
the net cost of children, preferably in dierent ways for dierent types of
households. As an example, the recent rebound in fertility in France (see
gure 1) has sometimes been linked in the media with various family policy
measures which date from the same period, particularly with the extension of
the \Allocation Parentale d' Education" to the second-born in 1994. Piketty
(2005) attempted to evaluate the consequences of this reform on fertility; he
concludes that they are very hard to isolate, but that the 1994 reform cannot
11Figure 1: Children per woman from 1901 to 2007
account for more than 20{30% of the observed increase in births.
We adopt a quite dierent approach: we resort to structural restrictions,
which hopefully only act as identifying constraints. Again, we condition on
x, and we drop it from the notation. We study the decision to work or not
(L = 1;0), with a newborn child or not (F = 1;0). The choice among the
four (L;F) pairs is derived from utility maximizing, where the utilities are
given by
U00 = U00(R00)
U01 = U01(R01)   c1
U10 = U10(R10)   10
U11 = U11(R11)   c1   11:
Given biological constraints, decisions are taken sequentially: a woman de-
cides on her fertility, then, given realized family composition, on her partic-
ipation. The solution, as in dynamic programming, is computed backwards:
12rst one compares U0F and U1F for a given value of F = 0;1, then the ex-
pected values of max(U0F;U1F) to choose the optimal F.
The utility indices ULF are deterministic functions of household incomes,
which are assumed to be perfectly anticipated. Without loss of generality,
we take 00 to be the reference situation for which the disturbance is normal-
ized to zero. The other random terms are written in such a way that 10
and 11 represent the labor supply disturbances in the second stage, given
realized fertility, while c1 represents a shock on the cost of a newborn child.
It is convenient to assume that the three terms (10;11;c1) are mutually
independent.10
Assumption 4
• the women anticipate perfectly their own wage as well as the wage of
their partner;
• the shocks on the disutilities of labor given the presence of a newborn or
not, 10 and 11, and the shock on the cost of a child c1 are independently
distributed.
We denote G0 (resp. G1) the unknown distribution of 10 (resp. 11),
and K the unknown distribution of c1. It turns out that these assumptions
are (almost) enough to identify the true utility functions U00, U01, U10 and
U11 and the distributions G0, G1 and K up to the usual scale and location
normalization.
First consider labour supply decisions given the realization of the \new-
born"variable F for a woman of characteristics (w;wm). Given the realization
of F, the woman decides to work i U1F > U0F. So she works with probability
PF(w;w
m) = GF (U1F(R1F(w;w
m))   U0F(R0F(w
m))):
This is of course the same problem as in section 2.2.1: a nice simplication
from our choice of stochastic specication is that c1 cancels out in the labour
10In fact we only need to assume that the couple (11;c1) is independent of 10. But it
would be messier since then we have to use the distribution of 11 conditional on c1 when
describing the labor supply decision after a birth.
13supply decision problem. Reparameterize PF(w;wm) as QF(R0F;R1F) as
before. Then we can apply Theorem 1, adapted to the new notation, for
given F = 0;1.
Theorem 2 Assume that the true model satises assumptions 1 to 4, and
in addition:
1. GF, U0F and U1F are strictly increasing and dierentiable;
2. GF(0) = 0:5;
3. the support R2F of the distribution of (R0F(wm);R1F(w;wm)) has a
non-empty interior;
4. it contains a (~ r0F; ~ r1F) such that U1F(~ r1F) = U0F(~ r0F);
then the utility functions are identied up to scale and location. More pre-
cisely, for any representation (gF;uLF) consistent with the data, there exist
numbers aF (positive) and bF such that for all (r0;r1) 2 R2F,
u0F(r0) = aFU0F(r0) + bF and u1F(r1) = aFU1F(r1) + bF;
and dening the functions F(r0F;r1F) = u1(r1F)   u0(r0F) over R2F, we
have
gF(y) = QF(r0F;r1F) if y = F(r0F;r1F):
Note that this implies that on the range of F, gF(y) = GF(y=aF).
Thus labor supply decisions in themselves give us some information about
utility functions; but this is not enough to allow us to identify incentive eects
of the R functions on fertility: changes in the ratio a1=a0 and in the cdf of
the cost of children c1, on which we know nothing as yet, can give totally
dierent estimates of the eect of fertility incentives.
To identify these remaining parameters, we of course need to study fer-
tility decisions. Nature comes to our help, in that fertility decisions must be
made in advance. The true indirect utility of a fertility decision F = 0;1 is
Emax(U0F(R0F(w
m));U1F(R1F(w;w
m))   1F)   cF
14where the expectation is only taken over the true cdf GF of the shock 1F,
whose value is known to the woman at the time she takes her fertility decision
(and we normalized c0 = 0.) Denote VF the expectation term in this formula.
Now for any variable  with cdf S, denote
H(S;;) = Emax(   ;):
Then we can write
VF = H (GF;U1F(R1F);U0F(R0F)):
Therefore the probability of a newborn F = 1 is









Labour supply data yield a representation (gF;uLF) equal to the true one
(GF;ULF) up to an intercept bF and a scale factor aF:
(
uLF(y)  aFULF(y) + bF
gF(aFy)  GF(y):
Any such choice of (a0;a1;b0;b1) generates its own representation of 
, call
it !. The data gives us the probability P(w;wm) that a woman has a baby,





with unknowns k, (a0;a1), and (b0;b1).
To go further, we need some regularity assumptions. We rst need to










Assumption 5 There exists (~ w; ~ wm) in the interior of W2 such that M0(~ w; ~ wm) 6=
M1(~ w; ~ wm).
Assumption 5 is very weak. It only requires that in expected terms (over
the shocks on the disutility of labor 10 and 11), the birth of a child changes
the utility value of an increase in the woman's potential wage, relative to
an increase in her partner's wage. There are several reasons why we expect
this to hold, with M0 < M1 in fact for most values of (w;wm). Let us just
mention two:
• since women spend more time with young children than men, an in-
crease in their wage-earning potential is (relatively) less valuable if
F = 1 since a birth reduces participation;
• some very signicant family benets, such as the APE in France, are
much more attractive for low earners.
Note that this assumption is testable: in fact, given utility functions uLF
obtained after estimating labor supply, and estimates PF(Z) of the proba-
bility of working after fertility outcome F = 0;1, the marginal utility of a
wage increase is just the average of the marginal utilities when working and
when not working, weighted by the corresponding probabilities11 which can










and this is enough to estimate MF since the derivatives of ULF are equal to
those of uLF, known up to a scale factor aF which cancels out in the ratio.
We will present estimates of M0 and M1 later on.
11Given our assumptions, no woman is ever at the margin of participation.
16We can now state
Theorem 3 Let all assumptions of Theorem 2 hold, along with Assump-
tion 5. Avvvssume in addition that :
1. K is dierentiable and strictly increasing at A(~ w; ~ wm);
2. the RLF functions are dierentiable at (~ w; ~ wm).
Then
1. the marginal utilities are identied locally up to a common scale param-









over W2 for some  > 0.
2. the cdfs of 10, 11 and c1 are also identied up to the choice of : any
representation (G0;G1;K) consistent with the data must satisfy locally
(
gF(y) = GF(y=) for F = 0;1;
k(y) = K(y=):
3. as a consequence, fertility eects of the tax-benet system are exactly
identied at every point of W2.
Proof: under these assumptions, let (uLF);(aF);(bF);(gF) be a represen-
tation compatible with the labour supply data. Now use (V) to dene for

























































































Everything in this equation is known at this stage, except for the ratio a1=a0.
So it determines this ratio uniquely, provided that the term that multiplies
it is not zero in some t. But if this term were zero, then so would the term
on the right-hand side; and simple algebra shows that then both M0 and M1
would be equal to the marginal rate of substitution of P. Taking Z = (~ w; ~ wm)
shows that
a1
a0 is identied since by assumption 5, M0 6= M1 in this point at
least.
Now x a0 =  > 0, which determines a1 and xes v0 and v1; and take
any Z 2 W2. Equation (Q) directly gives the density of k at k 1(P(t)) =
v1(t)   v0(t). Now suppose we change the tax-benet system so that RLF




















but everything in this formula is identied since, e.g.,
@v1
@R01




It is easy to see that a dierent choice of  would just rescale k0 and the
uLF's in opposite directions, QED.
182.3 Implementing our Approach
In our application, we use as endogenous variables in the survey of year t:
• for F = 0;1, the occurrence of a birth between surveys (t   1) and t
• for L = 0;1, employment in the current month in survey t.
We assume that when making her fertility decision at date (t 1), the woman
anticipates her (potential) market wage wt perfectly, as well as the employ-
ment and wage of the partner wm
t and the other characteristics of her house-
hold xt.
We found that we needed a large number of covariates x to control for
fertility decisions, with parity-specic fertility equations, age of the woman,
ages of existing children...This makes it infeasible to go beyond parametric
methods given the available data, even though the structure of our model
and the continuous nature of the key variables RLF;w;wm naturally suggests
using an average derivative estimation method. ADE would seem more prac-
tical for labor supply decisions conditional on fertility, since we need fewer
covariates there. But
• we also want to use observations for which wm = 0, which would require
adapting the ADE method;
• more importantly, we also need to account both for the minimum wage
and for missing wages.
On the other hand, we can validate the assumptions that underlie our
identication of fertility responses. We shall use the uLF obtained at the
rst stage to estimate VF up to the scale factors aF. This allows us rst
to compute the expected marginal rates of substitution M0 and M1 and to











A has a zero cross-derivative in (V0;V1):
19Our specication amounts to writing
Q = L(1V1   0V0   );
where L is a given cdf and F and  are linear functions of coecients and
covariates. This satises the zero cross-derivative property by construction.
To test it, we extend the specication by including quadratic terms. Denote
T the argument of L above; we estimate




and we test that 3 = 4 = 0. This is similar to the test of the index
assumption in Ichimura and Taber (2002).
3 Specication and estimation results
3.1 Data and specication
The model is estimated on data from the French labor force surveys of 1997,
1998 and 1999. We discard women who are civil servants, who are over forty
years old, or who nished their studies less than two years before they were
surveyed12.
We decided to only keep women who were born French. Immigrant women
(dened by being born non-French and outside of France) represent about
9% of fertile-age women in France, but 13% of births each year are to an
immigrant mother. This higher fertility is partly due to a dierent age prole
of immigrant women, and also to births being delayed until the wife of an
immigrant worker comes to live in France. Women who immigrated to France
before puberty in fact have very similar fertility to French-born women. Thus
the fertility of immigrant women has quite dierent determinants than that
of French-born women.
Furthermore, in the results that are shown below, we only consider births
12The latter is to avoid modeling the decision of pursuing studies or going into the labor
force.
20Employment
Fertility 0 1 Total
0 6,844 1,751 8,595
1 7,430 866 8,296
Total 14,274 2,617 16,891
Table 1: The sample structure
of parity 1, 2 or 3, and women who live with a partner. Just as for immigrant
women, the behavior of both large families and single parent families is signif-
icantly dierent, and elucidating it would require another paper. This leaves
us with a sample of 16,891 observations, whose distribution into employment
and fertility status is as in Table 1.
Our method relies heavily on the variation in nancial incentives induced
by variation in wages w and wm. Is there enough such variation in our





E1(wm) = R01(wm)   R00(wm)
E2(w;wm) = R01(wm)   R10(w;wm)
E3(w;wm) = R11(w;wm)   R10(w;wm)
Thus E1 refers to a woman who does not work before or after a birth, E2
to a woman who stops working, and E3 to a woman who works before and
after. Then we regress employment, w and wm on all explanatory variables;
we simulate the estimated equations to generate the three incentive measures
in the absence of idiosyncratic shocks. The results in Table 2 show that
shocks to wages account for a large proportion of the variance in the Ei's
across households, which buttresses our approach to identication.
The number of observations with a newborn child (2,617) is fairly small.
Therefore we shall have to be parsimonious when specifying the labor supply
of women who had a baby in the past year.
We take a basic linear specication with normal and logistic disturbances,
21Table 2: Breaking down the variance in incentives
Incentive measure Standard error (euros/month) Exogenous w wm
E1 270 88% 0% 12%
E2 1,000 47% 51% 2%
E3 90 45% 24% 31%
from which we shall experiment with variants. The rst ingredient in the
specication is the utility when working or not. It is assumed to be a linear
function of disposable income, and we take the disturbances aecting the
disutility of work and the preference for children to be normally distributed:
u0F(R0F(w




m) + F + "L;
(3)
where "L is a centered standard normal, and F, F and F depend on a
number of agents' characteristics, in particular on the presence (F = 1) or
not (F = 0) of a newborn in the household. Disposable income is computed
from wages and detailed features of the household through routines that






where the expectation is taken with respect to the shock "L, and we have
normalized to measure utility in monetary units13. The probability of having
a child is taken as a logistic:
Q =
1
1 + exp( Y )
;
where we have three dierent parameterizations for parity 1, 2 and 3, depend-
13The practical computation of VF follows simply from the equality
Emax(x   ";0) = x(x) + (x);
when " is a standard centered normal, with cdf  and pdf .
22ing on age in a exible way. The variables in Y include the dierence V1 V0
between the labor market utility indices with and without a newborn, as well
as the level V0, both interacted with age and diploma. On top of these nan-
cial incentives variables, we have age, by itself and interacted with diploma
and being legally married. For parity two and three, the composition of the
family enters and is also interacted with the nancial variables.
All parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood, with the endoge-
nous variable being the couple (L;F). In the basic version of the model,
there are 136 parameters to estimate. The estimation program is written in
R and the optimization takes a couple of hours.
Remark: A complication comes from the fact that the value of the
woman labor cost w is only observed by the econometrician for those women
who participate. We handle this issue as follows. We maintain the assump-
tion that every woman knows her potential wage w, and chooses her decisions
accordingly. But the econometrician does not know w for the non participat-
ing women. Then the econometrician postulates and estimates a model for
wages, and uses it to take the expectation of the likelihood of the woman's
decision. Following standard practice, we posit a Mincer equation for the
employer wage cost w:
logw = X + "w;
where X includes age at end of studies, time spent since end of studies and
their squares, as well as highest diploma obtained in ve categories. We
estimate the Mincer equation in a rst stage. To do this, we estimate a
participation model with exogenous fertility; we follow a procedure close to
Laroque and Salani e (2002) to take into account the existence of a (high)
minimum wage which bars a number of low skilled women from employment.
The results presented below take the Mincer equation as given, and in par-
ticular do not correct standard errors for the pre-estimation stage.
233.2 Estimation results
All the tables are gathered at the end of the paper. Incomes are measured
in hundreds of euros. To x ideas, the median monthly household income in
our sample (as measured by the observed value of RLF) is 1,950 euros.
3.2.1 Labor supply
We specify and estimate in a exible way the utilities of working from (3),
which are identied through the choice of a standard normal disturbance.
The coecients of F, which measures the sensitivity of the labor supply
of women to nancial incentives to work (R1F  R0F), are shown in Table 5.
For women without babies, who are in relatively larger number, 0 is repre-
sented as the sum of indicator functions, of annual age, of college education
and of the size of the family (parity 2 or 3). To interpret the magnitude of
the coecients, one must bear in mind the fact that on average half of the
women of the sample work: the shape of the normal distribution implies that
at the average point a change of 0:1 in the deterministic utility u1F   u0F
corresponds to a change of 4 points in the probability of working.
The sensitivity to nancial incentives seems to be slightly decreasing with
age, from around 0:27 to 0:20 for a low skilled woman without children (Ta-
ble 5). An increase of 100 euros in the monthly income of such a household
would increases the woman's probability of working by approximately 10
points. The sensitivity to incentives is slightly lower for educated women
and/or for women with two children, as a0 is reduced by .04 in both cases.
Given that only 15% of women in our sample have a baby in a given year,
we specify 1 as the sum of 0, a linear function of age, and an indicator
of a family with two children. The age term is insignicant, but the mean
estimate of these additional terms is negative; this suggests that the labor
supply of women with a newborn is less sensitive to nancial incentives. On
the other hand, having two children increases 1   0 by 0:08: so after the
birth of a third child women are more sensitive to nancial incentives.
The coecient F measures the income eects on labor supply and is
presented in Table 6. Leisure is a normal good for women without children:
24an increase of 100 euros per month of other income (i.e. of her husband
income) reduces their probability of working by 4 points on average. The
eect is reversed for women with a baby, as already seen in Laroque and
Salani e (2002): one interpretation is that having a husband with a larger
income allows the woman to hire child care and continue with her professional
career. Indeed for a second born, an increase of other income of 100 euros
per month increases the probability of getting a job by 7 points on average.
Finally the coecient F describes the constant term. For exibility, 0
is represented as the sum of indicator functions, of age dummies, of diplomas
and of household structure (see Table 7). The constant is modied for women
with a young baby, by adding a quadratic polynomial in age, with three
indicators of education and family structure. The results are by and large
unsurprising:14 high diplomas make women more likely to work, having two
children and/or a baby deters from work.
Given the estimated utility functions, we can compute the \expected
marginal rates of substitution"MF, equal to (@  VF=@w)=(@  VF=@wm), for each
observation of our sample. Figure 2 plots M1 against M0 for parities 0, 1 and
2. Our identifying assumption 5 only requires that the points do not cluster
too close to the diagonal, conditional on the exogenous variables that aect
fertility. The graphs above prove that M0 and M1 are rather dierent for a
large subset of values of x. Moreover, the great majority of observations has
M0 > M1 as expected. Of course, the only way to check that we have enough
variation for identication is to estimate the fertility model.
3.2.2 Fertility decisions
As already mentioned, fertility is specied as a logit, and the specication
and coecients dier across parities. The results are presented in Tables 8,
9 and 10 respectively for parities 1, 2 and 3.
14The only unusual sign is the negative one that appears in front of the `unmarried'
indicators. Women living with a partner, without being legally married, appear to have





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Scatter plots of M1 against M0
The main variable of interest is the dierence of the expected utilities
when having a baby or not, (V1   V0). This variable is interacted with age
education and family composition, but since 15% of the women in the sample
have a baby, we do not have enough degrees of freedom to use a full set of age
dummies. Instead we posit a spline function of age, with three knots located
at the 15%, 50% and 85% quantiles of the age distribution of the sample for
each parity.
We renormalized the estimated utility indices VF so that they can be
interpreted in hundreds of euros per month. Thus given the functional form of
the logit, a change of 100 euros per month in (V1 V0) changes the probability
Q of fertility by Q(1   Q), where  is the coecient of V that appears
in the tables. Take for example the change in Q for an average 24 year old
woman without children associated with an increase of nancial incentives of
100 euros. Since Q is equal to 0:17 on average for these women, the increase
in the probability of a birth is 0:17  0:83  0:21 = 0:030; these 3:0 points
represent a 17% increase in the fertility rate. Another way to phrase is that
this 0:17 gure measures the average semi-elasticity of fertility with respect
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Figure 3: Semi elasticity of the probability of fertility with respect to V1 V0




Given the very diverse household compositions and incomes, the semi-
elasticities vary a lot in the population. This appears clearly in gure 3,
which plots the distribution of the estimated semi-elasticity with respect to
(V1   V0) in our sample15. The rst striking fact is perhaps that for second
births (the middle panel), the estimated semi-elasticities cluster around zero:
only 30% are larger than 0:1, and 20% are in fact negative (albeit small).
Thus nancial incentives seem to play little role in the decision to have a
second child.
On the other hand, almost all estimated semi-elasticities are positive for
15Figures 3, 6, 4 and 5 focus on women of ages 24 to 36. Only 15% of rst births occur
before age 24, and 15% of third births occur after age 36.
27the third birth, and half of them are larger than 0:3. These are large eects:
according to our estimates, an increase of 100 euros per month would bring
the probability of a third birth from 0:08 to 0:11 for a woman with two
children at age 32 (which is the median age for a third birth.)
The picture is more mixed for rst births, as shown in the left panel of
gure 3. At the median age of 28 for a rst birth, almost all semi-elasticities
are positive, and half of them are above 0:16. The eect is twice larger on
average for younger women; on the other hand, it becomes negative for the
majority of women of age 30 and older. On the whole population of childless
women, 80% of estimated semi-elasticities are positive; and the median is
0:11, which is much smaller than for third births.
As the discussion above makes clear, the estimated eects are quite sen-
sitive to age. The prole of the estimated coecients of nancial incentives
(V1   V0) for each age is represented on Figure 4, along with the 95% con-
dence band. Other factors also play an important role. Note for instance
from Table 8 that childless college graduates seem to be more sensitive to
nancial incentives than women without a college education. This is partly
compensated by the fact that college graduates of course have children later,
when the baseline eect turns negative; still, they tend to have a slightly
larger semi-elasticity than other women. This is somewhat surprising; and
Table 10 conrms it for the third birth.
Our specication also allows for income eects, through the interactions of
V0 with age, education and family composition. The age prole, keeping xed
education and family composition, is represented on Figure 5. The overall
eect on fertility is negative for women with lower education, and close to
zero for those with a college education. Figure 6 shows a striking symmetry
to Figure 3: for each parity, the estimated densities are close mirror images
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Figure 6: Semi elasticity of the probability of fertility with respect to V0
A specication test. We carried out the test described in section 2.3.
When we include six 3 and 4 coecients (one of each for each of the three
parities), the test that they are jointly zero is rejected, with a p-value of
1%. However, this is due to parity 2: the null hypothesis is not rejected for
parities 1 and 3.
A quadratic variant. We checked the robustness of the results by
estimating a slightly dierent model, involving a quadratic income term in
the utility function:
~ uLF(R) = uLF(R) + dFR
2:
We allow the coecient d to dier according to F, as well as to parity.
Compared with the reference specication, there are six new coecients to





Emax[~ u0F; ~ u1F]:
30The point estimates of all the coecients are positive, pointing towards a
convex utility function. The coecients are largest for parity 1, smaller
for parity 0, and close to zero for parity 2. While the sum F + dFR0F
stays positive, some of the F coecients become negative. A likelihood
test indicates that the quadratic terms are highly signicant: the dierence
between the two values of the log-likelihood is 19.6, for six degrees of freedom.
However we have not pursued this specication as the improvement of the
t concerns labor supply, while the adjustment of fertility deteriorates.
The importance of nancial incentives. We estimated the reference
model, constraining all the thirty-six coecients of the value functions VF
in the fertility equation to be zero. The log-likelihood is reduced by 86:9
points, which is signicant at any level. Thus in statistical terms, nancial
incentives are highly signicant in the fertility decision.
4 Simulating a child credit
Unconditional Employment tested
Parity Fertility Work Work/newborn Fertility Work Work/newborn
1 2.6 -0.6 -1.2 1.6 -1.7 -7.5
2 1.1 -0.5 -1.0 0.7 -1.3 -5.4
3 3.0 -0.5 -0.9 2.5 -0.8 -5.1
All 2.2 -0.5 -1.0 1.6 -1.2 -6.0
Table 3: Changes in fertility and participation associated with a child credit
policy
Another way to describe the magnitude of the sensitivity of fertility to
nancial incentives is to mimic a reform of family benets. We approximate
such a reform by increasing the R's in case of birth by 150 euros per month.
This additional transfer is akin to a universal child subsidy, neither means
tested nor employment tested. This would be very costly|about 0.3% of
GDP|and therefore we take it as an upper bound of realistic policy changes.
31We can evaluate the eects of such a reform by adding it to our tax-benet
computation module, simulating its eects on labor supply, recomputing V0
and V1, and simulating fertility according to the above model. We contrast
the situations where the transfer is conditional on stopping work (R01 is
increased by 150 euros, not R11) or unconditional (both R01 and R11 are
changed). The aggregate results, shown in points of fertility and labor force
participation, appear in Table 3, with box-plot graphs of the impacts on
Figures 7 and 8.
The exercise conrms that the eects of nancial incentives on fertility
are sizeable. The unconditional child credit increases the fertility rate in
the sample by 2.2 points, from 15.5% to 17.7%. The increase is pronounced
for the rst and third children, smaller for parity 2. It is associated with a
modest decrease of .5 point in labor participation, from 49.1% to 48.6%.
When the child credit is conditioned on not working, the increase in fer-
tility is only 1.6 points, which is still large. The brunt of the reduction bears
on rst births: indeed women without children have the largest participa-
tion rate, 63.1%, to be compared with 47.8% for women with one child and
37.3% for women with two children. Unsurprisingly, the overall reduction
in participation is larger than when the child credit is unconditional, -1.2
point instead of -0.5. This eect is of course concentrated on women with a
newborn, for which it is huge: their participation goes down by 6.0 points16.
Conclusion
Our paper adopts an approach that diers from much of the literature on
evaluation. This choice is driven by the specic features of the problem we
study. Given that fertility behavior depends so crucially on ages (of parents
16This is in line with the results found in France after the extension of the Allocation
parentale d' education to the second born in 1994: its value amounted to 450 euros, and it












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Child credit: impact on fertility
33and of existing children), and that drastic reforms are few and far between,
most of the useful variation is to be found on cross section data. It consists
of the dierences in fertility- and employment-contingent household incomes
generated by dierences of (potential, conditional) wages and the specicities
of the French tax-benet system. Nonlinearities of tax-benet schemes have
been much used to study labor supply, see e.g. Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir
(1998) and Laroque and Salani e (2002). Indeed, these variations are su-
cient to nonparametrically identify labor supply behavior; but they are not
enough to identify the joint labor supply and fertility decisions. We therefore
introduce an additional assumption, which states that labor supply shocks,
conditional on realized fertility, are independent of the fertility shock. The
implied separability of the functional form can be tested along lines similar
to Ichimura and Taber (2002).
This orthogonality assumption is natural here, since the fertility decision
usually takes place about one year before the conditional choice of labor sup-
ply. It yields a nonparametric generalization of the nested logit specication;
this may be useful in other applications where the conditional independence
assumption is economically reasonable. As an example, work in progress by
Chiappori, Salani e, Tillman and Weiss uses a similar approach to examine
endogamy by ethnic group and education level.
In order to reduce the incidence of possible unobserved\taste for children"
factors, we used a very detailed specication by age and parity. The overall
procedure appears to work well and to yield robust results. Fertility is quite
sensitive to nancial incentives for the rst and the third birth, but it hardly
responds to them for the second birth.
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Appendix
The estimation results for the wage equation appear in Table 4. They are
very similar to those in our earlier papers and book.
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Parity 3 -.04 .01
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Table 5: The coecients of nancial incentives in labor supply
0
Variable estimate std error
Constant -.06 .01
Child aged 1 .01 .01
Child aged 2 .02 .01
Parity 2 .00 0.01
Parity 3 .03 0.01
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Table 6: Income eects in labor supply
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1998 Survey .31 .10
1999 Survey .63 .09
Dip. 1 .56 .08
Dip. 2 -.32 .10
Dip. 3 -.05 .03
Child.  3 -0.07 0.12
id.  6 -0.39 0.14
Parity 2 0.04 0.03
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Table 7: Constant terms in labor supply
40Variable Estimate Standard Error
V;age 24 .21 .07
V;age 28 .07 .08
V;age 32 -.15 .07
V0;age 24 -.04 .02
V0;age 28 -.00 .02
V0;age 32 .01 .02
V;college graduate .17 .08
V0;college graduate .00 .02
age 24 -.36 .28
age 28 -.71 .30
age 32 -.97 .34
unmarried -.47 .65
unmarried  age -.01 .02
college graduate -2.50 .86
college graduate  age .08 .03
Table 8: Fertility Eects for First Birth
41Variable Estimate Standard Error
V;age 26 -.07 .05
V;age 30 .07 .05
V;age 34 .01 .05
V0;age 26 -.04 .02
V0;age 30 -.05 .02
V0;age 34 -.04 .02
V;college graduate .00 .06
V0;college graduate .05 .02
V rst born is 1 .19 .09
V rst born is 2 .10 .06
V rst born is 3 .13 .06
V0 rst born is 1 .00 .02
V0 rst born is 2 .01 .02
V0 rst born is 3 .01 .02
age 26 .15 .35
age 30 -.67 .31
age 34 -1.50 .33
unmarried -2.76 .61
unmarried  age .08 .02
college graduate -1.62 .89
college graduate  age .03 .03
rst born is 1 -2.30 .48
rst born is 2 -.68 .34
rst born is 3 -.01 .36
rst born is 4 .91 .13
rst born is 5 .65 .15
rst born is 6 .21 .17
Table 9: Fertility Eects for Second Birth
42Variable Estimate Standard Error
V;age 27 .10 .07
V;age 32 .14 .06
V;age 36 .01 .07
V0;age 27 -.12 .03
V0;age 32 -.05 .02
V0;age 36 -.06 .02
V;college graduate .18 .10
V0;college graduate .09 .02
V one child is 1 .60 .54
V one child is 2 .35 .30
V one child is 3 -.02 .07
V0 one child is 1 -.01 .04
V0 one child is 2 -.03 .02
V0 one child is 3 -.01 .02
age 27 -.44 .61
age 32 -2.35 .50
age 36 -2.49 .51
unmarried -4.28 .99
unmarried  age -.14 .03
college graduate -.11 1.74
college graduate  age -.05 .05
one child is 1 -2.05 1.29
one child is 2 .31 .62
one child is 3 .81 .50
one child is 4 .36 .18
one child is 5 .41 .18
one child is 6 .30 .20
children between 7 and 10 .30 .17
Table 10: Fertility Eects for Third Birth
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